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Abstrat
We simulate a network of N routers and M network users making
onurrent point-to-point onnetions by buying and selling router apa-
ity from eah other. The resoures need to be aquired in omplete sets,
but there is only one spot market for eah router. In order to desribe
the internal dynamis of the market, we model the observed pries by N-
dimensional It-proesses. Modeling using stohasti proesses is novel in
this ontext of desribing interations between end-users in a system with
shared resoures, and allows a standard set of mathematial tools to be
applied. The derived models an also be used to prie ontingent laims
on network apaity and thus to prie omplex network servies suh as
quality of servie levels, multiast, et.
1 Introdution
To be able to provide guaranteed quality of servie, QoS, in a network, a user
needs to be able to reserve apaity, or 'bandwidth', in ongested routers. The
reservation sheme should be eient in the sense that one reservation should
not unneessarily blok other reservations, and it should not require extensive
negotiation. One sheme that ts these requirements is to trade router apaity
in spot markets. The assumption is that someone reserves apaity for a on-
netion by buying the apaity in the routers along the heapest path between
the soure and destination node. When the apaity is no longer needed, it is
sold to someone else. Inreased demand inreases prie, so alternative paths,
if they exist, may beome ompetitive, and the users will tend to move their
bandwidth usage away from ongested routers.
We ultimately want to be able to prie ontingent laims on resoures, for-
malized as options or futures. The working hypothesis is that adding a suitable
∗
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set of suh laims will improve the eieny of the resoure alloation, as pries
will better reet all available information. Indeed, the purpose of ontingent
laims on future value, suh as options, futures, or more generally, derivative
seurities, is to onstrut a market for trading the expeted future value. For
the problem studied here, this means trading in expeted future demand and
supply. One way to prie derivatives is to use statistial modeling of the prie
dynamis, sine under suitable assumptions, whih we will over in a forth-
oming separate ontribution, derivative pries are funtions of urrent market
pries and the statistial model[Blak73℄[Avellaneda99℄. This paper addresses
the neessary preliminary issue of how to estimate parameters in two stohasti
models from observed market pries, and also presents measures of the eieny
of the market resoure alloation sheme. These questions are also of indepen-
dent interest, as the eieny is to be used to ompare dierent market system
with eah other, and with other alloation shemes.
Using artiial markets for resoure alloation in distributed systems dates
bak to the mid 80ies, ranging over markets for storage apaity [Kurose89℄,
CPU time [Ferguson88℄ [Waldspurger92℄, and network apaity [Kurose85℄ [Sairamesh95℄.
The emphasis has been on evaluating the eieny of the resoure alloation,
rather than understanding the resulting prie dynamis. More reent work
stresses the agent aspet, i.e. that the trading parties are loally optimizing
entities [Faratin00℄. Combinatorial markets, i.e. trading of bundles of distint
resoures is yet a relatively new area. Somewhat related is the area of ombina-
torial autions [Rassenti82℄ [Rothkopf98℄ [Sandholm99℄. The use of derivatives
for network admission ontrol has been used in [Lazar98℄.
Previous bandwidth market models usually only inlude a primary market,
in whih end-users an buy and sell apaity only from the router owner. In the
presented model end-users trade amongst eah other, i.e. the apaity is traded
on seondary markets.
This paper is organized as follows: in setion 2 we present the model, of
whih a entral ingredient is a detailed mehanism of prie formation, with
very low overhead in user-user ommuniation. In setion 3 we model math-
ematially the resulting prie proesses. The main tools used are stohasti
dierential equations (It-proesses), their assoiated Fokker-Plank equations,
and the stationary distribution of those. In setion 4 we sum up an disuss our
results.
2 Method
2.1 Market model
We simulate a network onsisting of N inter-onneted routers and M network
users onurrently making reservations of router apaity for point-to-point on-
netions. There is one spot market per router, in whih users trade router
apaity.
We use Farmer's non-equilibrium market dynamis [Farmer00℄ as a presrip-
tion of how pries hange due to trading (see also se. 4). Farmer's model is
based on the assumption of a market maker that guarantees liquidity at all
times, and that buying auses pries to inrease, while selling auses pries to
derease. Farmer assumes that the prie dynamis is suh that it is impossible
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Figure 1: The network with 10 routers.
to move the market by performing a sequene of trades, where the net traded
volume is zero, and that the relative prie hanges are independent of the ur-
rent value of the prie. From these assumptions, Farmer derives a formula that
the prie per unit in a transation of ω units is S˜(S, ω) = Seω/λ, where S is the
unit prie in the previous trade, and λ the market depth or liquidity, i.e. the
rate at whih the prie is hanged by trading. For a derivation, see Appendix A.
This model is useful sine we do not have to simulate details of the order-book
in eah market. Instead, we an alulate the prie hange aused by trading
diretly from the last prie and the size of the trade.
2.2 Simulation setup
At eah time interval, m new demands are generated. A demand is a 7-tuple,
d ≡< id, uid, src, dst, cap, dur,max >
The user identities are hosen independently, so one user may reeive zero or
one or several new demands. If the urrent time is t, demand id speies that
the user uid demands cap units in eah node on a path from src to dst, starting
at time t and ending at time t + dur if it osts less than max to obtain the
resoures. If there are several paths, a hoie will be made, see below. During
the simulation a user reserves apaity in a router by buying that apaity, and
sells exess apaity that is no longer in need.
User i owns ri,j units of j. Initially, none of the simulated users are assigned
any resoures or money, i.e. ri,j = 0, cashi = 0 for all i and j, nor do they
have any resoure demand, ωi,j = 0. When a user manages to satisfy a demand,
its apital is inreased by the amount max, and when resoures are bought
and sold, the apital is dereased and inreased, respetively, by the ost of the
resoure. The simulation is run in L time steps from time 0 to T with time
inrements ∆t. At eah time step where the urrent time is t:
• Generate m new demands. A demand is speied by a unique demand
number id, a user uid randomly drawn from the set of M users, a soure
node src and a destination node dst, both randomly drawn from the set
of N nodes, and the required apaity per node cap, whih is randomly
drawn as the eiling of eKξ where ξ is a uniform random variable between
3
0 and 1. If some demand is more important than others, a user is willing
to pay more for that resoure. In this simulation, max is a linear funtion
of the required apaity, i.e. the maximum total ost max = Cunit cap,
where Cunit is a simulation parameter. The duration (number of time
steps) dur is randomly drawn integer between 1 and D.
• Calulate ωi,j , the net hange of resoure j of user i = uid in the following
way:
 For eah new demand d, user i looks at the last known transation
pries Sj(t) and deides to buy cap resoures along the least ost
path. Sine the user will not know the atual ost of a buying and
later selling resoures along a path, its deision on whether to buy
resoures or not, is determined by a parameter Cmax. The user de-
ides to buy the resoures if and only if the estimated total ost to
buy the resoures is less than Cmaxmax. The resulting demand cap
is then added to the ωi,j for all the resoures j on the least ost path,
and the amount max is added to cashi.
 For eah satised demand d terminating at t, deide to sell the re-
soures that were alloated (if any) to the demand, i.e. subtrat the
resulting supply of liberated apaity on the least ost path if the
demand was satised and router apaity was bought.
• All the demands on apaity in single routers (i.e. ωi,j) are eetuated
one by one in random order, and for eah trade pries are updated to
Sje
ωi,j/λj
. The cashi is dereased by ωi,jSj and the owned amount of
resoure is inreased by ωi,j . Aording to the prie formation formula,
the trades are made at pries whih depend on the atual order. The pries
payed by the users are thus not the same as those used for determining
the least ost path. The next known prie is the one that pertains after
all the trades, and is independent of the order.
• When all trading is done for this time-step, log the last transation pries,
Sˆ(t), the number of satised demands, and repeat.
2.3 Simulation Parameters
The simulation was run for L = 1000 time-steps (∆t = 0.01) using the network
in (g. 1). There were 10 routers and 10 users, so N = 10 and M = 10. The
liquidity in all Farmer markets was hosen to be λi = 10. The maximal ost per
route users were willing to aept was determined by Cunit = 100 and Cmax = 1
for all users. Initial pries were set to Sˆi(0) = 10 in all markets. Every time
step, m = 10 new demands were generated. The duration dur was uniformly
distributed between 1 and 10, i.e. D = 10. The all duration sets the time sale
in the simulation, as we will see below. The required amount of apaity was
determined by K = 2 (see above).
3 Results
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Figure 2: Plot of the unit prie of apaity in router 1 from time 0.01 to 10.
∆t=0.01.
3.1 Statistial modeling of the prie proess
Inhomogeneous drift, additive noise, onstant oeients The prie
as shown in (g. 2) does not appear to be drifting freely. Instead it appears
to return towards the same area. Assuming the prie proess is an Ornstein-
Uhlenbek proess, the dynamis for the prie of router i would be
dSi(t) = αi
(
µi − Si(t)
)
dt+ σidWi(t) (1)
whereWi(t) is a Wiener proess and the orrelation between two proesses i and
j is Corr[dWj (t), dWj(t)] = ρi,j . Reall that a Wiener proess has independent
normal distributed inrements with mean 0 and variane t − s, i.e. Wi(t) −
W (si) ∼ N [0,
√
t− s] where t > s. For improved readability, we omit the
indies in Si(t), et., when they are irrelevant for the understanding.
In (eq. 1) the drift term (the dt term) detrats when S is bigger than µ,
and adds when S is less than µ. The amount of the inrease is determined by
α. The diusion (the dW term) is independent of S.
When the simulation has run for suiently long time, the prie Si(t) be-
omes independent of the starting state of the system, and reahes a stationary
distribution P (t) of S(t). Using the Fokker-Plank equation (see Appendix A)
gives
P (s) = C0e
− 12
(
s−µ
σ/
√
2α
)2
(2)
where C0 = (piσ
2/α)−
1
2
, whih is the density funtion for a normal distribution
N [µ, σ√
2α
]. We note rst that the normal distribution is non-zero in all of
(−∞,∞), meaning that S(t) an take on negative values, something that is not
possible in a market with Farmer's dynamis. Seond, the normal distribution
has many good properties, suh as that a weighted sum of normal distributed
variables is also normal distributed. If pries are far from zero, this dynamis
may therefore be a onvenient approximation to the true distribution. Third,
5
the stationary distribution only depends on the ratio
σ2
α and an therefore not
distinguish between separate variations in σ2 and α, whih has to be done by
other means.
The observations Sˆ(i), i ∈ [1, ..., L] of the proess S in its stationary state
are regularly spaed with distane ∆t. Sine E[S] = µ, we estimate µ with
µˆ = Eˆ[S] =
1
L
L∑
i=1
Sˆ(i)
We estimate σ after noting that E[(dS)2] = σ2dt + O(dt dW ). Therefore, for
small ∆t,
σˆ2 =
1
∆t
Eˆ[(dS)2]
=
1
∆t
1
L− 1
L−1∑
i=1
(
Sˆ(i+ 1)− Sˆ(i)
)2
Sine V ar[S] = σ
2
2α , the unbiased estimate is
σˆ2
2αˆ
=
L
L− 1
(
Eˆ[S2]− Eˆ[S]2
)
so the estimate of α is
αˆ =
1
2∆t
∑L−1
i=1
(
Sˆ(i+ 1)− Sˆ(i)
)2
(∑L
i=1 Sˆ(i)
2 − (∑Li=1 Sˆ(i))2
)
To verify that the observed estimate is indeed orret, we an plot the his-
togram of the observed data together with the estimated density funtion P (s),
see (g 3). This estimation oinides with the maximum likelihood estimate of
the variables. A least square t to the values in the histogram gives a better-
looking urve. However, this t only gives µ and the ratio σ
2
α , as noted above.
Having estimates of α, µ and σ we are able to estimate the orrelation ρi,j
between the random soures for two prie proesses Si and Sj by solving dWi
and dWj in (eq. 1) and using the estimates
dWˆi(k) =
Sˆi(k + 1)− Sˆi(k)− αˆi
(
µˆi − Sˆi(k)
)
∆t
σˆi
so that the estimate beomes
ρˆi,j =
Cˆov[dWi, dWj ]
ˆ
Var[dWi]
ˆ
Var[dWj ]
=
1
L−1
∑L−1
k=1 dWˆi(k)dWˆj(k)
(∆t)2
where we have used E[dW ] = 0 and V ar[dW ] = dt.
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Figure 3: Histogram over the observed pries, the estimated normal distributed
density funtion N [µ, σ/
√
2α] (the red dashed line), and a least square error t
to the 15 olumns in the histogram (the green dotted line).
Inhomogeneous drift, multipliative noise, onstant oeients The
dynamis in (se. 3.1) an generate negative pries, something whih is should
not be possible in a well-funtioning market. By asserting a mean-reverting
dynamis with multipliative noise we get a proess that is stritly positive.
Assume the dynamis for the prie of router i to be
dSi(t) = αi
(
µi − Si(t)
)
dt+ σiSi(t)dWi(t) (3)
where Wi(t) is a Wiener proess and the orrelation between two proesses i
and j is Corr[dWj(t), dWj(t)] = ρi,j . As before, we we omit the indies in Si(t),
et., for readability.
The stationary distribution P (s) of S is
P (s) =
(γµ)γµ
Γ(γ)
e−
γµ
s
(1
s
)γ+2
(4)
where γ ≡ 2ασ2 , and Γ(z) is the gamma funtion. In (eq. 4) s takes only positive
values, whih is onsistent, sine the dynamis in (eq. 3) does not move an s
from positive to negative.
The rst moment of this distribution, E[S] is µ (see Appendix A). As for
the Ornstein-Uhlenbek proess above, we estimate µ with
µˆ = Eˆ[S] =
1
L
L∑
i=1
Sˆ(i)
We annot easily estimate σ from E[(dS)2] sine S is in the drift term, but note
that the proess X(t) = log(S(t)) in (eq. 8) has additive noise. Therefore, we
7
get for small ∆t,
σˆ2 =
1
∆t
Eˆ[(dX)2]
=
1
∆t
1
L− 1
L−1∑
i=1
(
log
Sˆ(i + 1)
Sˆ(i)
)2
To estimate α, we try two approahes. First we use the onditional expetation
E[S(t+ τ)|S(t)] for S in the stationary state of the system. Taking the partial
derivative w.r.t τ gives a rst order ODE with the solution
E[S(t+ τ)|S(t)] = e−ατ (S(t)− µ) + µ
showing that the expeted value approahes µ exponentially with τ and α de-
termines the speed of the return. Rearrange to keep e−ατ (whih is independent
of S(t)) on one side, take the logarithm and take the expeted value of both
sides. Let τ = k∆t. We now have an estimate for α,
exp(−αˆ k∆t) = 1
L− k
L−k∑
i=1
Sˆ(i+ k)− µˆ
Sˆ(i)− µˆ
As we an see from the left hand side of the equation above, plotting the right
e−
α
k
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Figure 4: Left g.: the estimate yˆ = e−αk∆t derived from the onditional expe-
tation of S(t+τ) for the rst 20 time-steps in blue, and the plot of y = e−αˆk∆t in
green. The estimate may be less than zero due to the noise from the simulation.
Right g.: the ovariane between S(t + k∆t) and S(t). The auto-orrelation
deviates some from an exponential, possibly beause the prie dynamis has
higher order than assumed. It would explain why the estimate in the left plot
deviates from an exponential. Simulation time, 100 000 time steps, λi = 10, and
D = 100.
hand side as a funtion of k should result in a straight line if α is onstant.
However, as we an see in (g. 4), the line is straight up to some k that depends
on the simulation parameters and error. The estimation is very sensitive to
errors in µˆ, espeially in the denominator if Sˆ is near µˆ, whih results in a
attened out jagged line, sine e−αˆ k∆t is less than the simulation error for
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Figure 5: Histogram over the observed pries and the estimated gamma distri-
bution. µ and σ are estimated using the moment method, and after that, α is
estimated with a least square error t.
larger k. It eventually attens out whih means that α appears to derease for
larger τ .
Another way to estimate α is to estimate µ and σ as above, and then t the
observed distribution to the distribution (eq. 4) using the least square method.
See (g. 5) for a plot of the model t.
Having estimates of α, µ and σ we are able to estimate the orrelation ρi,j
between the random soures for two prie proesses in the same way as above,
by solving dWi and dWj in (eq. 3) and using the estimates
∆Wˆi(k) =
Sˆi(k + 1)− Sˆi(k)− αˆi
(
µˆi − Sˆi(k)
)
∆t
σˆiSˆi(k)
so that the estimate beomes
ρˆi,j =
1
L−1
∑L−1
k=1 dWˆi(k)dWˆj(k)
(∆t)2
where again we have used E[dW ] = 0 and V ar[dW ] = dt.
Plotting the histograms of ∆Wˆ shows us if the model is good. If that is the
ase, the ∆Wˆ should behave like samples of a Wiener proess, i.e. be normal
distributed. As an be seen in (g. 6), the model (eq. 3) ts well if the market
liquidity is high. However, if market liquidity is low then the assumed prie
model does not provide a good t.
Prie Correlations The resoure pries in a network of resoures depend
on the pries of other resoures, sine they are traded in groups. Using the
parameter estimates of the prie dynamis above, we get the orrelation matrix
in (tab. 1) for a simulation with high liquidity markets (λi = 100).
We nd that pries generally are positively orrelated. Comparing with the
network graph(g. 1), one an see that pries of neighboring nodes often are
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Figure 6: The left gure shows the histogram (in red) over ∆Wˆ in the simu-
lation desribed in (se.2.3) with λi = 10, and a tted density funtion for a
normal distribution (in blue). The right gure shows the histogram of another
simulation with the same parameters exept for the market liquidity whih is
λi = 100.
strongly positively orrelated with an average orrelation oeient of around
0.4, ompared to 0.03 for nodes that are not onneted. The most signiant
exeption is nodes 3 and 7. Looking at the network graph it is lear that no
least ost path an ontain both 3 and 7, exept for the path from 3 to 7.
3.2 Eieny of the market based resoure alloation
The eieny of a market based resoure alloation sheme depends on how well
pries reet the available information about resoure demands. Two soures
for bad performane is that prie quotes are outdated, or that they do not
reet knowledge about the prie behavior, e.g. periodi prie utuations, or
future pries. To measure eieny, we an measure the resoure utilization to
ompare whih markets are able to apture most information.
Communiation osts The number of messages sent in the negotiation phase
of this kind of system is negligible, sine all users operate on old prie quotes
and plae bids at market, i.e. aept the prie whatever it may be. They do not
update their prie quotes for every bid. Therefore, less than M messages per
trade ome in to a user (the potential quote update from eah market). One
message per trade (the bid) go out from eah user to the markets that ontain
resoures that the user have hosen. No messages need to be ommuniated
between the end-users.
Suessful onnetion ratio In the Farmer market model, the less liquid the
markets are, the less valid are the prie quotes. To the left in (g. 7) the ratio
10
Router 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 1 0.33 -0.03 0.06 0.48 0.21 -0.05 0.08 -0.04 0.05
2 1 0.02 -0.12 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.60 0.12 0 .36
3 1 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.43 -0.03
4 1 0.38 0.40 0.20 -0.12 0.50 0.09
5 1 0.03 0.05 -0.09 0.11 -0.01
6 1 0.02 -0.11 0.09 0.46
7 1 0.15 0.45 -0.02
8 1 0.41 0.12
9 1 0.01
10 1
Table 1: Correlation oeients for ∆Wˆ for a simulation with λi = 100, after
5000 time steps. Conneted routers are in bold fae.
of suessful onnetions is plotted as a funtion of the market liquidity λi for
simulations with the parameters desribed in (se. 2.3). The graphs orresponds
to dierent values of the deision parameter Cmax. Low liquidity auses large
prie utuations, making the pries higher than the limit Cmaxmax (see se.
2.2) whih inhibits many onnetions. Note that a onnetion is onsidered
suessful even if the net ost (after releasing the resoures) is higher than max.
Net prot To the right in (g. 7) we plot the average prot as a funtion
of the liquidity for a number of values of Cmax. Large values of Cmax auses
the users to buy resoures when they are expensive. If the liquidity is high,
the users sell resoures at approximately the same prie, but with low liquidity,
pries will move signiantly downwards when the resoures are sold, ausing a
net loss to the user.
The partiular way the max ost for a onnetion is determined of ourse
very muh determines whih of the dierent kinds of tra that is promoted in
the network. Dierent shemes ould for instane promote short or long paths,
high or low apaity onnetions, et.
Average load The average load, or reserved apaity in a router is with the
Farmer dynamis a diret funtion of the market prie, ω(t) = λ log S(t)S(0) . If two
simulations that alloate the same onnetions dier in load, the higher load
depends on ineient routing that does not hoose eient path. If the simu-
lations dier in alloated onnetions, the omparison is less straight forward,
and depends on the hoie of metri above. We intend to return to a longer
disussion on eieny, in partiular for load balaning, in a future ontribution.
4 Disussion
In our simulation, Farmer's market dynamis an be interpreted either as pre-
sriptions of how a rational market maker should modify the market pries, or as
a model of the aggregate behavior of market prie hanges during some period
of time.
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Figure 7: To the left, average ratio of suessful onnetions as a funtion of the
market liquidity. The graphs from bottom to top have Cmax equal to 1, 4, 16
and 64. To the right, average net prot as a funtion of market liquidity. The
graphs from bottom to top have Cmax equal to 64, 16, and 4, showing that a
high Cmax auses losses on average in a low liquid market.
With the former interpretation, the Farmer dynamis an be used to im-
plement a market maker program that brokers trading between end-users. The
dynamis is derived from the assumption that it is impossible to hange pries
by 'trade in irles'. This assumption is a neessary ondition for any mar-
ket maker strategy, sine otherwise anyone an exploit the market and gain an
unlimited amount of money from the market maker.
The latter interpretation an be used when we want to simulate a part of
a market with many onurrent trades. Sine trading auses pries to hange
means that it is impossible to have updated prie information at the time they
plae their bid. It is only possible to have ompletely updated prie info if the
trading is synhronous, something that severely redues the number of bids a
market an handle per time unit if ommuniation delays are taken into aount.
The market liquidity (or market depth) parameter λi determines the speed
at whih pries hange. When the dynamis interpreted as presriptions for a
market maker, it is up to the market maker to adjust λi in order to redue the
risk of running out of resoures. If we model an existing bandwidth market, λi
is an observable parameter whih must be determined from the distribution of
prie jumps in relation to traded volume. The more resoures in relation to the
order size, the larger λi. A bandwidth market that is trading the apaity of
a high apaity router an, everything else being equal, be expeted to have a
higher λi than a similar market for a ongested or ineient router.
In the mean reverting proesses investigated here, α determines the speed
with whih the proess returns towards its statistial average µ. The speed of
return depends on the harateristi time length of the system, determined by
the simulation parameter D, the all length. With a large D, the pries will
be orrelated with previous pries over a longer time period, whih results in a
small α. With a small D, the prie eet of previous alls will soon be forgotten,
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resulting in a high α.
The traditional statistial models used for telephony have been found to in-
adequately model data network tra. Data ommuniation has been found
to show a very bursty or fratal behavior as one ommuniation event often
generates a burst of more ommuniation to other parts of the network. Data
ommuniation is generally short lived and often with strong lateny bounds,
due to the inreasing use of omputer networks for interative ommuniation.
For short lived ommuniation with low transfered amount, traditional swithed
best eort networks will probably ontinue to provide a very eient solution
for a long time. However, with inreasing demand of streaming real-time data
suh as high quality video-telephony, video-on-demand, et., it is neessary to
be able to reserve apaity. The alternatives are large buers, whih has bad
lateny performane, or migrating data (intelligent repliation), whih an re-
due load for one-to-many ommuniation. Neither is suited for point-to-point
ommuniation servie guarantees.
In the 'bandwidth market' presented in this paper, end users buy the required
resoures themselves. The demand for updated prie quotes results generates
additional network tra. In an extended model, we ould allow risk neutral
middle men to sell options on the resoures. Sine updated quotes will then only
be required by the (few) middle men doing the atual trading, the additional
tra would be greatly redued. We intend to return to these topis in future
work.
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Appendix A
Stationary Distribution
S(t) is an It proess with the dynamis dS(t) = a(t, S(t))dt+ b(t, S(t))dW (t),
and P (s, T ; s0, t) is the ontingent probability distribution of S at time T given
S(t) = s0. P obeys the Fokker-Plank equation a.k.a the forward Kolmogorov
equation,
− ∂TP − ∂s
(
a(T, s)P
)
+ ∂ss
(b(T, s)2
2
P
)
= 0 (5)
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An important lass of stohasti proesses are those that are stationary. For
those, if T − t is suiently large, the ontingent distribution P no longer
depends on s0, and an be substituted with the stationary distribution P (s),
whih does not depend on s0, t or T . Two ways in whih a stohasti proess
an fail to be stationary is if the oeients, e.g. a and b, are expliitly time-
dependent, or if there is no distribution P (s). The latter happens for instane
in ordinary random diusion, in whih the probability gradually spreads out
without reahing a limit.
Assuming that a stationary distribution has been reahed, the time deriva-
tive drops out of (eq. 5), and the equation an be integrated one to be
∂sP (s)− 2a(s)− 2b(s)∂sb(s)
b(s)2
P (s) = 0 (6)
whih is an ODE. One further integration of (eq. 6) gives
P (s) = C e
∫ s
0
2a(u)
b(u)2
du 1
b(s)2
(7)
where C is a normalization onstant determined by
∫
P (s)ds = 1.
The Additive Noise Proess
Stationary density funtion, mean and variane Assume the prie dy-
namis
dS(t) = α(µ− S(t))dt+ σdW (t)
Then the onditional stationary probability distribution of S is, using (eq. 7),
P (s) = C0e
− 2α
σ2
∫
s
0
(µ−u)du
= C0e
− 12
(
s−µ
σ/
√
2α
)2
where C0 = (piσ
2/α)−
1
2
. P (s) an be identied as the density funtion for a
normal distribution with mean µ and variane σ2/2α.
The Multipliative Noise Proess
Stationary density funtion Assume the prie dynamis
dS(t) = α(µ− S(t))dt+ σSdW (t)
Using (eq. 7)
P (s) = C1e
2α
σ2
(∫
s
s0
µ
u2
du−
=log s−log s0︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ s
s0
1
u
du
)( 1
σ s
)2
=
1
C2
e
2α
σ2
(
−µs
)(1
s
) 2α
σ2
+2
An alternative derivation is to let X(t) = logS(t). It's lemma gives that
dX =
(
αµe−X − (α + σ
2
2
)
)
dt+ σdW (8)
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Then the stationary probability distribution Q(x) of X is , using (eq. 7),
Q(x) = C0e
∫
x
0
(
− 2
(
αµe−X−(α+ σ
2
2
)
)
σ2
)
du 1
σ2
= C1e
−γµe−x+(γ+1)x
where C1 is a normalization onstant, and γ ≡ 2ασ2 for readability. The stationary
density funtion P (s) for S is found by realling X = log(S) and
P (s)ds ≡ Q(log(s))d(log(s))
=
1
C2
e−γµ
1
s
(1
s
)γ+1 1
s
ds
The onstant C2 is determined by normalization and identifying the integral
as a gamma funtion, Γ(z + 1) =
∫∞
0 t
ze−tdt = zΓ(z). After the substitution
t = γµ 1s we get
C2 =
∫ 0
∞
e−t
( 1
γµ
t
)γ+2
(−γµ 1
t2
)dt
=
( 1
γµ
)γ+1 ∫ ∞
0
e−ttγdt
=
( 1
γµ
)γ 1
µ
Γ(γ)
Stationary mean Use the same substitution, t = γµ 1s to obtain
E[S] =
∫ ∞
0
sP (s)ds
=
∫ 0
∞
(
1
γµ
t)
1
C2
e−t
( 1
γµ
t
)γ+2
(−γµ 1
t2
)dt
=
1
C2
( 1
γµ
)γ ∫ ∞
0
e−ttγ−1dt
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Γ(γ)
= µ
Conditional expeted value Let f(τ |S(t)) be the onditional expetation
of S(t+ τ) given S(t).
f(τ |S(t)) ≡ E[S(t+ τ)|S(t)]
= S(t) + E[
∫ t+τ
t
dS(t′)|S(t)]
= S(t) + αµτ − α
∫ t+τ
t
E[S(t′)|S(t)]dt′
Take the partial derivative with respet to τ
∂τf(τ |S(t)) = αµ− αE[S(τ)|S(t)]
= αµ− αf(τ |(S(t))
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Multiplying with eατ and olleting the terms gives
∂τ
(
eατf(τ |(S(t))
)
= eαταµ
Integrate both sides over τ from 0 to τ and multipliation with e−ατ gives
f(τ |S(t)) = e−ατ(S(t)− µ)+ µ
where we have used that f(0|S(t)) = S(t). Therefore
e−ατ =
f(τ |S(t))− µ
S(t)− µ
The left side does not depend on S(t). Taking the expeted value of both sides
e−ατ = E[e−ατ ]
= E
[E[S(t+ τ)|S(t)] − µ
S(t)− µ
]
=
∫ ∞
0
E[S(t+ τ)|S(t) = x]− µ
x− µ P (x)dx
where P is the stationary distribution of S, and we have substituted a time
average with an ensemble average, whih is true under suitable assumptions.
Estimation of parameter α We an estimate the integral from the observed
data using the estimates
Pˆ (x) ≡ 1
N
∑
t
δ(x− Sˆ(t))
Eˆ[S(t+ τ)|S(t) = x] ≡
∑
t|Sˆ(t)=x Sˆ(t+ τ)
|{x|Sˆ(t) = x}|
where δ(x) is the Dira delta funtion and |A| is the ardinality of the set A.
The estimation is
e−αˆτ ≡
∫ ∞
0
Pˆ (x)
Eˆ[S(t+ τ)|S(t) = x]− µˆ
x− µˆ dx
=
∫ ∞
0
( 1
N
∑
t
δ(x− Sˆ(t))
)
Eˆ[
S(t+ τ)− µˆ
x− µˆ |S(t) = x]dx
=
∑
x|Sˆ(t)=x
1
N
|{x|Sˆ(t) = x}|
∑
t|Sˆ(t)=x
(
S(t+τ)−µˆ
x−µˆ
)
|{x|Sˆ(t) = x}|
=
1
N
∑
t
Sˆ(t+ τ) − µˆ
Sˆ(t)− µˆ
so we an estimate α with
αˆ(τ) ≡ − 1
τ
log
( 1
N
∑
t
Sˆ(t+ τ)− µˆ
Sˆ(t)− µˆ
)
whih should be a onstant funtion.
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Farmer's market dynamis
Let S be the urrent prie, ω the net demand and S˜ the prie at whih the
demand an be met. We seek a funtional relationship of the type S˜ ≡ S˜(S, ω),
where S˜ depends ontinuously on S and ω. Assume the prie to be positive
and bounded, S˜ to be an inreasing funtion of ω, and that pries are only
hanged through trading, S˜(S, 0) = S. Assume furthermore that one annot
make money by trading in irles
S˜(S˜(S˜(S, ω1), ω2),−(ω1 + ω2)) = S (9)
and the relative prie hange is independent of the absolute prie,
S˜(S, ω)
S
= φ(ω) (10)
Beause of (9) we see that S˜(S˜(S, ω),−ω) = S, so the inverse is S˜−1(S, ω) =
S˜(S,−ω), where S˜−1 is the inverse funtion of S˜. Applying S˜−1(·,−(ω1 + ω2))
on (9) to see that
S˜(S˜(S, ω1), ω2) = S˜(S, ω1 + ω2) (11)
(10) together with (11) implies that φ(ω1)φ(ω2) = φ(ω1 + ω2) whih implies
φ(x) = ex/λ for some onstant λ. Therefore
S˜(S, ω) = S eω/λ (12)
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